The final text of the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA)

Preamble 51 to 60, Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA)

(51) The propagators of cyber-attacks tend to pursue financial gains directly at the source, thus exposing financial entities to significant consequences. To prevent ICT systems from losing integrity or becoming unavailable, and hence to avoid data breaches and damage to physical ICT infrastructure, the reporting of major ICT-related incidents by financial entities should be significantly improved and streamlined.

ICT-related incident reporting should be harmonised through the introduction of a requirement for all financial entities to report directly to their relevant competent authorities. Where a financial entity is subject to supervision by more than one national competent authority, Member States should designate a single competent authority as the addressee of such reporting. Credit institutions classified as significant in accordance with Article 6(4) of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 should submit such reporting to the national competent authorities, which should subsequently transmit the report to the European Central Bank (ECB).

(52) The direct reporting should enable financial supervisors to have immediate access to information about major ICT-related incidents. Financial supervisors should in turn pass on details of major ICT-related incidents to public non-financial authorities (such as competent authorities and single points of contact under Directive (EU) 2022/2555, national data protection authorities, and to law enforcement authorities for major ICT-related incidents of a criminal nature) in order to enhance such authorities awareness of such incidents and, in the case of CSIRTs, to facilitate prompt assistance that may be given to financial entities, as appropriate.

Member States should, in addition, be able to determine that financial entities themselves should provide such information to public authorities outside the financial services area. Those information flows should allow financial entities to swiftly benefit from any relevant technical input, advice about remedies, and subsequent follow-up from such authorities. The information on major ICT-related incidents should be mutually channelled: financial supervisors should provide all necessary feedback or guidance to the financial entity, while the ESAs should share anonymised data on cyber threats and vulnerabilities relating to an incident, to aid wider collective defence.

(53) While all financial entities should be required to carry out incident reporting, that requirement is not expected to affect all of them in the same manner. Indeed, relevant materiality thresholds, as well as reporting timelines, should be duly adjusted, in the context of delegated acts based on the regulatory technical standards to be developed by the ESAs, with a view to covering only major ICT-related incidents. In addition, the specificities of financial entities should be taken into account when setting timelines for reporting obligations.

(54) This Regulation should require credit institutions, payment institutions, account information service providers and electronic money institutions to report all operational or security payment-related incidents – previously reported under Directive (EU) 2015/2366 – irrespective of the ICT nature of the incident.

(55) The ESAs should be tasked with assessing the feasibility and conditions for a possible centralisation of ICT-related incident reports at Union level. Such centralisation could consist of a single EU Hub for major ICT-related incident reporting either directly receiving relevant reports and automatically notifying national competent authorities, or merely centralising relevant reports forwarded by the national competent authorities and thus fulfilling a coordination role. The ESAs should be tasked with preparing, in consultation with the ECB and ENISA, a joint report exploring the feasibility of setting up a single EU Hub.

(56) In order to achieve a high level of digital operational resilience, and in line with both the relevant international standards (e.g. the G7 Fundamental Elements for Threat-Led Penetration Testing) and with the frameworks applied in the Union, such as the TIBER-EU, financial entities should regularly test their ICT systems and staff having ICT-related responsibilities with regard to the effectiveness of their preventive, detection, response and recovery capabilities, to uncover and address potential ICT vulnerabilities.

To reflect differences that exist across, and within, the various financial subsectors as regards financial entities’ level of cybersecurity preparedness, testing should include a wide variety of tools and actions, ranging from the assessment of basic requirements (e.g. vulnerability assessments and scans, open source analyses, network security assessments, gap analyses, physical security reviews, questionnaires and scanning software solutions, source code reviews where feasible, scenario-based tests, compatibility testing, performance testing or end-to-end testing) to more advanced testing by means of TLPT.

Such advanced testing should be required only of financial entities that are mature enough from an ICT perspective to reasonably carry it out. The digital operational resilience testing required by this Regulation should thus be more demanding for those financial entities meeting the criteria set out in this Regulation (for example, large, systemic and ICT-mature credit institutions, stock exchanges, central securities depositories and central counterparties) than for other financial entities.

At the same time, the digital operational resilience testing by means of TLPT should be more relevant for financial entities operating in core financial services subsectors and playing a systemic role (for example, payments, banking, and clearing and settlement), and less relevant for other subsectors (for example, asset managers and credit rating agencies).

(57) Financial entities involved in cross-border activities and exercising the freedoms of establishment, or of provision of services within the Union, should comply with a single set of advanced testing requirements (i.e. TLPT) in their home Member State, which should include the ICT infrastructures in all jurisdictions where the cross-border financial group operates within the Union, thus allowing such cross-border financial groups to incur related ICT testing costs in one jurisdiction only.

(58) To draw on the expertise already acquired by certain competent authorities, in particular with regard to implementing the TIBER-EU framework, this Regulation should allow Member States to designate a single public authority as responsible in the financial sector, at national level, for all TLPT matters, or competent authorities, to delegate, in the absence of such designation, the exercise of TLPT related tasks to another national financial competent authority.

(59) Since this Regulation does not require financial entities to cover all critical or important functions in one single threat-led penetration test, financial entities should be free to determine which and how many critical or important functions should be included in the scope of such a test.

(60) Pooled testing within the meaning of this Regulation – involving the participation of several financial entities in a TLPT and for which an ICT third-party service provider can directly enter into contractual arrangements with an external tester – should be allowed only where the quality or security of services delivered by the ICT third-party service provider to customers that are entities falling outside the scope of this Regulation, or the confidentiality of the data related to such services, are reasonably expected to be adversely impacted.

Pooled testing should also be subject to safeguards (direction by one designated financial entity, calibration of the number of participating financial entities) to ensure a rigorous testing exercise for the financial entities involved which meet the objectives of the TLPT pursuant to this Regulation.

Note: This is the final text of the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA) - Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on digital operational resilience for the financial sector and amending Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009, (EU) No 648/2012, (EU) No 600/2014, (EU) No 909/2014 and (EU) 2016/1011 (Text with EEA relevance).

Articles, Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA):